All joking aside. I was talking to Jameel and the most disturbing part of the Winograd report is what is NOT being discussed by anyone.

Overall it appears that conclusions of the report was that the military was unprepared, but more significantly, the political echelons were completely indecisive and unskilled when it came to using the army and defending the North.

One opinion was that they should have launched a major strike against Lebanon’s strategic resources, and another was that a major ground offensive should have been launched – in either case, it should have happened in the first few days, and the war shouldn’t have been let to drag on with no results and no decisions for such a long time, including even deciding if it was a war in the first place.

But is the situation in the Negev any different?

Missiles are flying at Jewish cities and towns, and the army has its hands tied by the political echelon, restricted to limited attacks, and low-intensity conflict, as opposed to either a major ground offensive or major strikes strategic targets.

There is no real difference. The lessons leading to Winograd haven’t been learned.

A very good analysis can be found on Ben-Chorin.

Highlights of the report in English can be found here.